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An earlier version of this article was published as Commons: Can This 
Be The Name of Thirdness?  Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. 
25. 1. (1995). It was thoroughly revised in November, 2018. 
 
Commons: Can This Be The Name of 
‘Thirdness’? (Revised) 
 
Roger A. Lohmann 
Emeritus Professor 
West Virginia University 
 
Introduction 
Everyone interested in research and theory of nonprofit 
organization, voluntary action and philanthropic studies 
has their own tale to tell about how they came to be 
interested in this subject.  In my case, my theoretical 
interests come from a variety of experiences in 
community practice. 
After graduating from college in the mid-1960’s, I spent a 
couple of years as a reporter and editor at two local 
newspapers in central Minnesota. One of my regular 
beats was local government, where I received a “front 
row” education on the then-emerging subject of federal 
grants to local governments. I gradually zeroed in on 
news coverage of grants from the Office of Economic 
Opportunity for pre-school programs (Head Start), youth 
employment (Neighborhood Youth Corps) and other 
similar programs. My articles apparently attracted the 
attention of the state OEO office and I was contacted by 
their field representative for Southern Minnesota, Gene 
Flaten, and encouraged to apply for any of three open 
positions. 
 I was hired to establish and direct a small, rural 
community action agency in three counties of the First 
Congressional district in Minnesota.  The Congressman 
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from this district at the time, Rep. Albert Quie, had 
established himself as one of the principal House critics 
of the War on Poverty and its controversial Community 
Action Program (CAP). his district was one of the 
bastions of conservatism in the liberal Democratic-
Farmer Labor state still dominated at that time by Vice 
President Hubert H. Humphrey.   
Whether out of loyalty to Quie, ideology, principle, or 
other possible motives, county commissioners in roughly 
15 counties, and city officials in the larger cities of 
Rochester and Winona were unwilling to authorize 
participation in the war on poverty.  The party line was 
that there were no poor people in these counties, 
although statistics, subsequent experience and even the 
officials’ own county welfare departments told a very 
different story. The county and city officials’ 
unwillingness amounted to a kind of legal blackball. 
since the existing guidelines mandated that one third of 
the board of CAP agencies should be elected or appointed 
local officials. It also meant that grant funds for CAP 
programs could not be awarded in those areas. Thus, the 
Minnesota First District was one of the last areas in the 
Midwest to establish CAP agencies and did so only in the 
face of official local opposition, intent on branding this 
activity as illegal and even in some instances, 
subversive.  
The solution to this (devised by Flaten, with support 
from the Governor’s Office of Economic Opportunity and 
the OEO Regional Office in Chicago) was to by-pass 
reluctant elected county officials and seek involvement of 
leading citizen volunteers who replaced the third public 
officials. The final result included a number of small-
town mayors seeking grant money for additional workers 
and local school officials interested in the Head Start 
program. 
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From my personal vantage point decades later, the shift 
from community action with the support of local officials 
to the quasi-voluntary associations of citizens’ action 
councils is far less interesting than the working 
knowledge of nonprofit law, tax policy, and the complex 
problems of legitimacy, representation, board 
composition, and relations between nonprofit 
corporations and the state and federal governments that 
came with implementing this solution.  
Another formative experience of some personal 
importance gives me an ongoing experience with another 
central theoretical issue of the third sector.  In West 
Virginia, we have a network of local roads known as 
“orphan roads” because they were abandoned by the 
state years ago and county governments have 
consistently refused to adopt (and in particular, 
maintain) them!  These are fully public roads: Anyone 
can drive on them and do, They are in the most real 
sense public goods, but their maintenance is completely 
left to property owners who live along them.  To add to 
the confusion, the county sheriff has stated on more than 
one occasion that he will enforce any speed, traffic and 
stop signs which neighborhood associations authorize 
and install.  
For more than three decades our home was located on 
one such orphan road in a neighborhood with an 
organized and fairly active but unincorporated 
neighborhood association which assumed maintenance of 
three streets on the basis of purely voluntary 
membership dues and has authorized a number of speed 
limits and stop signs. Membership in the association 
overall was quite high, but legally voluntary.  Only a 
small minority of us on my street participate or support 
the association.  This has given me an on-going practical 
exercise in the conflicts and problems of voluntary 
action– and also the limits – of “free-riding” for the three 
decades. This situation changed recently as the City of 
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Morgantown reached agreement with two of the three 
streets in the neighborhood and annexed them – and 
assumed responsibility for managing the streets. For us, 
this means no more spring “patching parties” with pick-
up loads of asphalt and no more association meetings to 
debate what to do and whether or not additional stop 
signs, street lights or fire hydrants were needed. It also 
means we are now served by city fire and police services 
rather than the County Sheriff and a nearby volunteer 
fire department. 
In addition, over the course of my career I spent parts of 
five decades as an officer, board member, consultant and 
educator for a variety of community nonprofit service 
organizations. All of these experiences, mostly in small 
towns and rural areas in the Midwest and Appalachia, 
have contributed to my own understandings of what we 
still call the third sector. 
Theory As A Problem in Language 
My interest in third sector theory arose out of my 
personal experiences and interests and has been most 
concerned with language, basic terms and fundamental 
questions.  
We can begin an exploration of the theoretical space 
termed the “third sector” with the observation that the 
denomination third comes from the better-theorized 
“other two” spaces: the political state and market order. 
(Lindblom, 1977) The third, from this perspective is the 
space outside or apart from states and markets. 
Apparently for the economic and political theorists who 
are largely responsible for the term these three are 
exhaustive, while others see other possibilities (e.g., 
Smith, 1991). In the commons theory of voluntary action, 
I have advanced the possibility of a fourth sector termed 
the family or household sector or intimate sphere. In this 
context, the term third sector refers to the social, 
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economic, political and cultural space outside or apart 
from markets, states and households. 
Based on any of these we can ask: if it is a third sector 
that interests us, of what does its ‘thirdness’ consist? And 
how can we find better labels for those qualities of 
greatest interest? In seeking answers to such a question, 
I have relied heavily on what in the earlier version of 
this I called the poetics of theoretical physics. That 
proved to be an interesting choice of phrases – one which 
provoked a derisive public comment by the president of 
an international research association at a conference I 
was attending in Europe later that year. My colleague, it 
seems, did not share my enthusiasm for creative 
language.  
Nevertheless, I remain impressed by the manner in 
which, in the face of the impossibility of direct, empirical 
observation and the barrage of new, unexplained 
phenomena, physicists employ both creativity and 
rigorous logic in their uses of metaphor and invented 
terms.   If physicists can deploy language resources to 
name mesons and a quark named charm (to name just a 
few of dozens of such examples), why should those of us 
in the social sciences feel so bound theoretically by the 
terms and thought ways of 19th century German and 
French?  Why, for example, must virtually every named 
process end in -tion ?  
Social science theory is also constrained by the fact that 
subjects of the theory speak the same language(s) as the 
theorists. In third sector studies, for example, the 
accountants, managers, members, fundraisers, 
consultants and others routinely employ the same 
terminology as the most hidebound theorists. But this 
may not be the barrier it can appear to be.  In 
considering the third sector theoretically, we may yet 
come to realize that  the traditional language of 
participants of the sector is less a liability than an asset. 
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One of the most fundamental tasks facing the theoretical 
advancement of voluntary action and philanthropy 
involves simply being more creative with the language.  
In those cases where there are already adequate terms 
(like benefactor and patron), why not simply continue to 
use them, and build them into theory?  When adequate 
summary terms are missing, and only convoluted and 
ambiguous expressions like “nonprofit service 
organizations” are used, should it not be a primary task 
of theory to create new and better terms?  Since the 
earlier version of this article first appeared, I have 
continued to practice this approach to language with 
several old terms rescued from near oblivion or given 
new meanings and literally dozens of new and borrowed 
terms introduced into the commons theory of voluntary 
action. See Lohmann, (2015, pp. 12-14) for a partial list. 
Portmanteau terms like philanthropology have been 
particular favorites. Combining an anachronistic form of 
factory (“manufactory”) with the conventional term 
“benefactor”, in the simple sense of someone who 
dispenses benefits has a very salutory result in 
benefactor. 
When perfectly adequate terms (like dower) have 
fallen into disuse, why should we not recessitate them 
for theoretical purposes?  Indeed, it appears that this is 
precisely what is occurred with the term “philanthropy”, 
which had clearly fallen out of favor and was at risk of 
extinction before being rescued, first as a summary term 
for foundations and fundraising, and more recently in 
much more robust terms (McCully, 2008).   
Use of the conventional language of the sector is 
no panacea.  Not all theoretical language problems in 
this field can be easily sorted out.  Some terms (e.g., 
foundation and endowment) are gradually losing their 
general meanings and taking on much more limited (and 
less theoretically interesting) connotations.  Some very 
basic terms (e.g., nonprofit, voluntary and community) 
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seem to be almost limitless in their ambiguities and  
contradictions.  Even so, there is much theoretical 
richness yet to be mined out of the careful consideration 
of terms in this field. 
Through using roughly these kinds of basic language 
operations, I have derived a couple of candidate general 
theoretical terms intended to speak directly to the issue 
of the thirdness  of the third sector in what I have been 
calling a “theory of the commons”:  At one level, I 
concluded in the early 1990s that the five conditions of 
the Greek term koinonia politike  attributed to it by the 
ancient historian Moses Finley appeared to summarize 
quite well what most of my colleagues found to be the 
essential thirdness of the third sector: They are 
characterized by “voluntary” (uncoerced) participation; 
shared purposes; shared resources; mutuality (or social 
capital) and indigenous standards of fairness (or moral 
order). 
More recently, I have divided these five definitional 
terms into two groups (Lohmann, 2015). The first three 
can be seen as formative or constitutional of voluntary 
action, while the latter two are better seen as emergents, 
arising from ongoing operations by the formed or 
constituted associations or assemblies of voluntary 
action. 
Thomasina Borkman concluded in a presentation at the 
1991 ARNOVA conference that these five terms closely 
matched the central concerns of a national panel on self-
help groups.  Such borrowing of terms from Latin or (in 
this case) Greek is a common practice in the third sector, 
as with charity, philanthropy and other terms.  However, 
koinonia politike does not appear to work well as an 
umbrella term for the third sector: “the koinonia” lacks 
panache and “the koinoniac sector” is downright arch.   
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If, however, one were to utilize yet another ordinary 
language process and attach the characteristics of 
koinonia  to (in effect translating the Greek term as) a 
more conventional English language term, the results 
might be worthy of consideration as a sector label.  My 
own candidate for this is the term “commons”, because of 
its traditional connotations of a shared space, prior 
related usage (i.e., “the tragedy of the commons”), its 
etymological similarities with community and 
communications and its versatility as a noun and 
adjective (as in common goods and common resources). 
More recently, I have drawn an additional distinction 
between “old” commons, or traditional, medieval, 
customary and ‘folk’ practices mostly in agriculture and 
irrigation carried out solely by cooperative agreement 
among participants, and “new” commons supported by 
various legal institutions and self-governance 
arrangements such as accreditation and 
professionalization. Increasingly significant is the 
category of commons labeled as knowledge commons 
(Hess & Ostrom, 2007). 
One of the major reasons for using the term commons is 
the robust additional language it suggests. Thus, if the 
third sector is designated as a commons, this suggests a 
further usage of equally great importance.   The general 
class of products or results produced by or within the 
commons can be termed “common goods.”  To do so, 
however, presents some difficulties.  One of the greatest 
is use of the terms “public goods” and “common goods” as 
synonyms.  In The Commons, I introduced a way to 
differentiate between public good as the (general or 
singular) common good and particular common good(s) 
produced by various associations and assemblies of the 
commons. Along with this, the theory introduces the 
possibility that while the three sectors (family, market, 
state and commons) are associated with distinct ideal 
types of goods (intimate, private, public and common), in 
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actuality any type of goods can be produced in any 
sector.  
The most complete initial statement of the theory to date 
is found in book form. In The Commons: 
Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Nonprofit 
Organization and Voluntary Action, (Jossey-Bass, 1992)  
I set forth a multidisciplinary theoretical interpretation 
of what I take to be the essential characteristics of 
nonprofit organization, voluntary action and 
philanthropy. In a series of papers, chapters and journal 
articles published since 1992, I continued to add to the 
perspective, and I tried to summarize these in Voluntary 
Action and New Commons (2015).  
From the start, the perspective of the commons has 
sought to take emphasis off the large enduring 
institutions and quasi-commercial nonprofit 
establishments as definitive of the third sector and place 
it instead on the more ephemeral, participatory, 
collective and mutual endeavors of voluntary action. The 
latter are often also smaller, possessing fewer resources 
and farther from the central corridors of power.  To state 
the matter most directly, my intent with the theory of 
the commons is to locate the “heart and soul” of the third 
sector in the commons.  The core of thirdness is found in 
the clubs, mutual aid societies, neighborhood 
associations, community churches and other commons 
displaying uncoerced participation, shared purposes and 
resources, mutuality and indigenous standards of 
fairness, rather than in the giant foundations, national 
oligarchies and quasi-commercial nonprofit firms which 
so frequently position themselves to speak in the name of 
the contemporary third sector. 
At some point, however, any theory of the third 
sector straining after completeness must come to terms 
with the commercial or entrepreneurial nonprofits as 
well.  While they may be assigned a role which is 
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theoretically marginal to the core of the commons as a 
social, political and economic construct, their importance 
in contemporary public life can hardly be disputed.  
(Certainly, I do not wish to do so.)  Indeed, stimulating 
debate over the role of voluntary action in the third 
sector was the original intent of commons theory (c.f., 
Lohmann, 1989, pp. 367-8). The challenge still facing the 
theory of the commons in the 21st century is whether the 
theoretical terms and perspectives of commons theory 
offer a meaningful theoretical basis for approaching the 
entrepreneurial and commercial nonprofit corporations 
and “shadow state” extensions of public policy which 
make up such a quantitatively large part of the 
contemporary third sector. (Dart, 2004; Wolch, 1990)    
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